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CONCLUSION

"No man is an island,entire of itself... .
"It has been said that a judge is a member of the Bar who once knew a
Governor. -2
I.

INTRODUCTION

Judicial recusal is the mandatory, optional, or self-proscribed removal of
a judge from a case. The standard has most recently been objective: recusal
is necessary when the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.4
Thus, actual bias or prejudice by the judge is not necessary.5 Justice must

1. JOHN DONNE, DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS No.17 (1624); see also Romans
14:7 (King James) ("For none of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself.").
2. CURTIS BOK, THE BACKBONE OFTHE HERRING 3 (1941).

3. See generally ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2003) (setting forth widelyaccepted
standards
for
judicial
recusal),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/mcjc-home.html. Throughout this paper, disqualification, which is
mandatory recusal, is used interchangeably with recusal.
4. See id. at Canon 3E.
5. Id.
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have the appearance of justice.6 When the recusal is not voluntarily initiated
by the judge it is called disqualification.
The typical inquiry regarding judicial recusal is whether the judge
stands to make or lose more than minimal amounts of money,7 or whether
the judge has a family interest with an individual who is closer than a cousin
and is directly involved in the case. 8 Additionally, if the judge shows
extreme antipathy or a particularized predisposition to one side of the case,
recusal is necessary. 9
When recusal is mandatory, non-recusal fatally flaws the judicial

proceeding. In the Fourth Amendment context, the lack of a "neutral and
detached" magistrate invalidates a warrant,' ° and is not subject to harmless
error resuscitation of the proceeding." In other cases, judicial bias rises to
the level of a Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause violation,
12
and mandates a new trial.
This paper will discuss the case and statutory law of judicial recusal.
Attention will be placed primarily on influential model standards and treatise
authority, federal case and statutory law, and state experience. There is a
glaring gap in the law on the issue of when a judge must recuse himself or
herself because a party or advocate in the case is a friend.' 3 Many related
recusal standards are discussed throughout this article. The purpose of this
discussion is to show that a friendship recusal standard is possible and
consonant with the present-day objective and specific standards and trends
regarding recusal.

6. Id. at Canon 3E cmt.
7. Id. at Canon 3E.
8. Id.
9. Id. Although there is no recusal standard regarding friendship, there is some minimal
jurisprudence on recusal regarding "being enemies"-nevertheless, an admitted enemy (a standard
almost impossible to meet) will mandate recusal because impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550-51 (1994); see also infra notes 128-35
and accompanying text.
The so-called "extra-judicial source" doctrine is essentially the
jurisprudence of "enemy" recusal. See infra notes 136-45 and accompanying text. It is discussed
herein to show that specific standards are possible and necessary.
10. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-50 (1971) (official issuing the
invalid warrant was also prosecuting the case).
11. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991) (judicial partiality is a structural
error not subject to harmless error analysis).
12. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825, 828-29 (1986).
13. The gap may or may not be intentional. Certainly the term "friend" has essentially been
dismissed as a factor mandating recusal; but it has also been ignored. It is hoped that this has been
an oversight. It is feared that this dismissal allows the powers that control the law to hold on to their
control and entrench it.
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The problem is not new. When President Thomas Jefferson arranged
for Vice President Aaron Burr to be tried for treason (for attempted cessation
of the Western Territories), Burr reportedly played chess with Chief Justice
John Marshall during the trial.14 Burr was acquitted, 16later fled after killing
15
Alexander Hamilton in a duel, and the rest is history.
More recently, flamboyant Associate Justice Antonin Scalia arranged
for a very special hunting trip with Vice President Dick Cheney and
accepted a ride on Air Force Two-all during the pendency of litigation
before the United States Supreme Court, with the Vice President a named
party. 17 Justice Scalia was asked to recuse himself on these grounds. He
refused, setting in motion a tsunami of impotent protest.
Using treatise, federal, other case and statutory law, and law review
studies, it appears that there is a paucity of authority on point. Provided
there is no monetary gift, no familial (blood) proximate relationship, no
verifiable and unjustifiable judicial animosity, no judicial incompetence or
corruptness, and no romantic or sexual judicial entanglement-friendship,
standing alone, is not grounds for mandatory recusal.18
Judges should not, and are not'expected to live isolated lives separate
from all potential lawyers and litigants who may appear before them.' 9 In
one sense, this is necessary and axiomatic. Judges were, in their earlier
days, successful practicing lawyers. They had to be "discovered," and
discovery requires that the judge (then lawyer) knows many influential
lawyers, politicians and business people. So mere acquaintance, obviously,
could not practically or logically be grounds for recusal. If so, judges would
be recused (disqualified) from many, if not most, cases.
However, it is also axiomatic that justice, to be justice, must have the
appearance of justice, 20 and it appears unjust when the opposing side shares
an intimate (but not necessarily sexual) relationship with the judge. It is
therefore proposed that a new standard be included in the lengthy list of
recusal/disqualification factors: Friendshipbetween the judge and a named

14. For one version of this "serious judicial indiscretion," see ALF J. MAPP, JR., THOMAS
JEFFERSON: PASSIONATE PILGRIM 131 (1991).
15. See generally RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON (2004) (providing an account of
Hamilton's death).
16. See generally JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHER: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION
(2002); JOSEPH WHEELAN, JEFFERSON'S VENDErTA: THE PURSUIT OF AARON BURR AND THE
JUDICIARY (2005).

17. See generally Motion to Recuse, Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the D.C., 542 U.S. 367
(2004) (No. 03-475) (setting out detailed reasons why Justice Scalia should recuse himself),

available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/scotus/chny22304scrbrf.pdf.
discussion see discussion infra Part XII.
18. See discussion infra Parts I1,
IV.

For a more detailed

19. This would be both an impractical and unreasonable standard.
20. In fact this axiom is the root of the objective impartiality standard that is now the law. See
discussion infra Part VI.
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party or attorney of record, that exceeds ordinary and reasonable social
intercourse between acquaintances and business associates, mandates
judicial recusal. Perhaps this was an unworkable standard in sparsely
populated agrarian Colonial America. But there are plenty of judges now,
and it is accepted that lawyers can be temporary, pro tempore, judges when
there is a need.21
Friendship, as defined by this author, is intimacy beyond social or
business collegiality (politeness). 2 Friendship is loyalty, and loyalty to one
side of a case (be it a named party or lawyer) is the perfect antonym to
impartiality. Partiality being the perfect definition of a bad judge.
This paper will build to this conclusion. It will first discuss the
applicable clause and commentary of the American Bar Association (ABA)
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, and then comment other treatise authority.
This paper will then examine federal (and other) authority as well as law
review approaches, and will enumerate hypothetical situations indicating
that the proposal herein is needed, prudent, and workable. Ultimately, this
discussion will reveal the present lack of a usable standard regarding
friendship recusal, and will present several judicial impartiality values that
are consistent with the above proposed friendship recusal standard.
II.

THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, propounded in 1972, and as
amended through August 2003,23 sets out, in Canon 3, the general judicial
recusal standard.24 Subsection E is worth quoting in entirety (commentary is
omitted) and reads as follows:

21. See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5E (1990).
22. Cf MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 258, 261-

67 (3d ed. 2004). In work that is characteristically brilliant, the authors walk to the brink of a
workable standard, then shy away into irrelevance by loosely defining friendship and by creating an
unworkable standard of "close" versus ordinary friendship-the former mandating recusal, the latter
not. Id. The authors then venture into a possibly ad hominem attack on Justice Scalia without
admitting Scalia's taunting brilliance that the standards are amorphous on this point. Id. These and
related points will be discussed, infra Parts Ill-IV.
23. See generally LISA L. MILFORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE (1992)

(explaining the evolution of the Model Code from the 1972 version through the 1990 one); STEPHEN
GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS 636-37 (2006).
24. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon

3

(2003),

available at

http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/canon_3 .html.
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E. Disqualification
(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in
which the judge's impartiality* 25 might reasonably be questioned,
including but not limited to instances where:
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party
or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge* 26 of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(b) the judge served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or
a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served
during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or
the judge has been a material witness concerning it;
(c) the judge knows* that he or she, individually or as a
fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, parent or child wherever
residing, or any other member of the judge's family residing in
the judge's household,* has an economic interest* in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding or
has any other more than de minimis* interest that could be
substantially affected by the proceeding;
(d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third
degree of relationship* to either of them, or the spouse of such
a person:
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director or
trustee of a party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known* by the judge to have a more than de minimis
interest that could be substantially affected by the
proceeding.
(e) the judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that
a party or a party's lawyer has within the previous [] year[s]

25. Impartiality is defined in the introductory section, entitled "Terminology." "Impartiality" or
"impartial denotes absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of
parties, as well as maintaining an open mind in considering issues that may come before the
judge ....
ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/pream-term.html#TERMNOLOGY.
26. This requires actual knowledge, which may be inferred. Id. Note: further asterisks will not
be footnoted unless the meaning is obscure or not obvious.
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made aggregate* contributions to the judge's campaign in an
amount that is greater than [[$] for an individual or [$] for an
entity] [[is reasonable and appropriate for an individual or an
entity]].*
(f) the judge, while a judge or a candidate* for judicial office,
has made a public statement that commits, or appears to
commit, the judge with respect to
(i) an issue in the proceeding; or
(ii) the controversy in the proceeding.27
Aside from the verbose nature of this judicial recusal provision, it is
unremarkable.
In short, judges must recuse themselves when their
impartiality might reasonably be questioned from an objective standpoint.
Impartiality might be so questioned when judges stand to make or lose
money, when a close relative is intimately involved, when they were
personally involved with the proceeding, or when they have expressed a
specific opinion on the case (outside of court).
This is a good start, but it is glaringly silent on the specific issue of the
intimacy we call friendship.
In the ABA's August 2003 amendments, section 3E(1)(f) was added to
insure that candidates running for judicial office (including sitting and
would-be judges) not be precluded from exercising their First AmendmentFree Speech Clause guarantees.
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,29 the High Court
pronounced it to be unconstitutional to muzzle judicial candidates regarding
contested legal issues (not actual cases) that might someday be litigated
before their court.3 ° Thus, recusal became even more difficult.
The High Court itself made a "Statement of Recusal Policy," in 1993,
which was signed by most of the Justices.3 However, this statement

27. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/canon_3.html.
28. STEPHEN GILLERS
STANDARDS 637 (2006).

& ROY D.

SIMON,

CONDUCT

Canon

REGULATION

OF

3E

(2003),

LAWYERS:

available at
STATUTES

AND

29. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
30. Id. at 788.
31. Press Release, Chief Justice Rehnquist et al., Statement of Recusal Policy (Nov. 1, 1993).

discussed recusal only as it pertained to blood relatives and family of
Justices; 32 friendship was not its subject.
Perhaps most surprising is that the ABA's new draft of the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct, if anything, takes pains to further minimize the
friendship recusal issue. 3 3 Let us discuss that, then move on to discuss other,
perhaps more fruitful, sources.
4

A. Canon I of the June 2004 Draft3

Canon 1 reads: "CONDUCT IN GENERAL: A JUDGE SHALL
AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY
IN ALL THE JUDGE'S ACTIVITIES, SO AS TO A [sic] UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY, INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY OF THE
JUDICIARY."35
The Commentary to this Canon and its similar, but minimally more
specific, Standard 1.01, also adds in the term "impartiality., 36 Paragraph 2
of the Commentary to Standard 1.01 begins, "Avoiding impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety is an overarching principle of judicial conduct
embodied in this Canon itself."37 In fact, this is an important clause because,
although the emphasis must be on an objective standard of impartiality
(reasonably appears impartiality might be questioned), the drafters slip in the
older standard of actual (subjective) partiality as a reason for judicial
disqualification.38
The older standard of actual partiality was far more forgiving.39
Appearances could be ignored. The present-day standard, focusing on
appearances, is more protective of the system of justice. With a bit of
discrimination, however, it is clear both standards are necessary. If in fact
the judge is partial, but no one but the judge knows, that plainly should be a
reason for judicial disqualification. Even though this secret partiality might

32. The federal recusal statute, which this statement addressed, 28 U.S.C. § 455, will be
discussed in Part VI of this paper.
33. Access to this new draft can be found on the ABA's website. See ABANet.org, Commission
Drafts, available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/drafts.html.
34. Accessing this on the ABA website shows, via underline and strike-out, proposed
amendments. See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (Discussion Draft June
2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/redline_canonl 051104.pdf.
When
relevant, these proposed amendments will be pointed out in the textual discussion.
35. Id. This draft adds the word "impartiality"-not present in the prior draft-and is potentially
a promising addition.
36. Id. at 1.01.
37. Id. at 1.01 cmt. 2.
38. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 265.
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1952) (amended 1976).
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be nearly impossible to discover, it nevertheless must be overtly stated (in
the judicial ethics code) as being unacceptable for a judge.
Then, however, the draft plummets in applicability to the focus of this
paper. Paragraph 6 of the Commentary to Standard 1.01 redlines (strikes
through) the following sentence: "Because it is not practicable to list alll
[sic] prohibited acts, the proscription is necessarily cast in general terms that
extend to conduct by judges that is harmful although not specifically
mentioned in this Code."' 0 The Model Code and its redraft list a plethora of
inappropriate judicial acts, including monetary ties, family ties, degree of
family ties, contact with parties, prior relationship with the case, treatment of
jurors, membership in discriminatory organizations, sexist comments, public
comments on pending cases, and nepotism in hiring.4 '
Indeed it is probably impossible to list all prohibited judicial acts
leading to a conclusion of partiality, but it is possible to list friendship. If
there is a gross flaw and ignorance, it is because the sentence reeks of
sophistry, as it is impossible to list all specific instances of any prohibited
conduct. For example, each murder is different, but we can divide the crime
into premeditated killings, killings by ambush, killings by bomb, killings by
poison, killings by felony perpetration, intentional (non-calculated) killings,
and reckless killings.42
Whether it is the power of the bench, fear in damaging the friendship
camaraderie club of the federal and state bars, or that this is a "taboo" or
"missed" issue, the American Bar Association falls short here. 43 This strike
out is the major flaw in the new code. This paper aims to prove that there
are specific and unequivocal recusal standards and that friendship recusal
can and should be one of those specifically enumerated.

40. See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1, 1.01 cmt. 6 (Discussion Draft June
2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/redlinecanon 1051104.pdf.
41. See generally ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2003) (providing a widelyaccepted code ofjudicial conduct), availableat http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/mcjchome.html.
42. See JEREMY M. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW: TREATISE AND HYPOTHETICALS 93-102 (2001).

43. Rightly or wrongly, the American Bar Association has been no stranger to litigation,
including Consent Decrees from the Department of Justice and Department of Education. For a
most insightful look at some of this, see ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN
AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s (1983).

44

B. Canon 2 of the June 2004 Draft

Canon 2 parrots Canon 1 with its chapter heading: "JUDICIAL
CONDUCT: A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL
OFFICE IMPARTIALLY AND DILIGENTLY. 4 5
Standard 2.04 reads: "Impartiality and Fairness. A Judge shall apply the
law without regard to the judge's personal views and shall decide all cases
with impartiality and fairness. 46 Although this may sound well and good, it
is somewhat silly. Everyone always decides issues with their enlightened
personal views, their selfish personal views, or something in between. 47 Is
this standard the best that the best minds can do?
In fairness, Commentary paragraph 1 begins, "A judge must be
objective and free of favoritism to ensure impartiality .... ,48 Favoritism is
the operative word. Favoritism indicates a proclivity to one side, generally
based on shared friendship or philosophy.49 It is axiomatic that a judge's
philosophy cannot be eradicated (absent lobotomy)-otherwise why would
there be such recurrent and rampant debates regarding judicial
confirmation? °
But, we can potentially create a rule whereby we remove a judge for
being more than a social or business acquaintance with an interested party,
i.e., a "friend."' Sadly, the draft ignores this important issue.
We must go to Standard 2.10, "External influences on judicial conduct"
to find even a hint at how to tackle this problem.12 Subsection (b) reads: "A
judge shall not allow family, social, political or other relationships to
influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment."53 A critical reading of
this clause notes that "social" factors may be a reason for recusal, but the
clause omits express reference to friendship, as something either subsumed
in the term "social," or as not worth referencing. Most individuals have
hundreds of social contacts which are essentially meaningless. But most

44.

See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (Discussion Draft June 2004),

available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/redline-canon2_0511 04.pdf.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2.04.
47. See, e.g., FRANCOIS DUC DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, REFLEXIONS; OU, SENTENCES ET
MAXIMES MORALES 39 (1678).
48. See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, 2.04 cmt. I (Discussion Draft June

2004), availableat http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/redline-canon2_051l04.pdf.
49.

See COLLINS GEM WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 227 (2d ed. 2002).

50. At the time of this writing, the United States Senate was pondering changing its procedural
filibuster rules, the so-called "nuclear option," so as to prevent forty-one Senators from leaving
chambers and, thus, preventing approval of a judge.
51. See infra Parts III-XIV.
52. See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, 2.10 (Discussion Draft June 2004),
availableat http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/redlinecanon2_051104.pdf.
53. Id.at2.10(b).
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individuals 54have fewer than ten friends, and these relationships are

meaningful.

The Model Code's redraft is fully unsatisfactory in its treatment of the
extraordinarily important issue of judicial recusal based on friendship.
III. Is

"FRIENDSHIP" CAPABLE OF DEFINITION?

IS

THAT THE PROBLEM?

In this section, a definition of friendship will be offered. Were it an
undefinable concept, perhaps the Model Code and redraft positions might be
defensible. There was a definition offered above 55-but let us examine
several sources, and discern if that definition is workable. We will begin
with the greatest of all philosophers, Plato,56 move to a dictionary
definition,57 and finally discern what, if anything, law or treatises have
commented."8
A.

Plato's Lysis ("On Friendship')

Western philosophy begins and ends with Plato. 59 Thus, it is fitting to
begin with the classic Socratic dialogue, Lysis.6 ° It is a dialogue principally
between Socrates and two boys. The most difficult hurdle for a present-day
reader is that one of the boys is extremely physically attractive, and the other
and he are in the midst of a same-sex relationship, which may be underage.61 One not at ease with either same sex relationships, or with the
obvious comfort Plato felt in describing such, might obscure the purpose of
the dialogue. The frequent "blushes" and references to physical beauty
throughout the dialogue might prove to be a distraction to many a presentday reader.

54. See, e.g., 2 CARL SANDBURG, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE WAR YEARS 404 (1939).
55. A friend is another human to whom one feels loyalty. This loyalty is not based on money,
family or fear. A friend is one to whom the friend feels admiration, love and respect-which are
distinct from ordinary social or business acquaintance and the requisite collegiality (politeness)
associated with that social or business intercourse. This is this author's definition-but is not a new
fabrication. It is a synthesis, as will be shown later in this article.
56. See infra Part III.A.
57. See infra Part III.B.
58. See infra Part III.C.
59. Robert J. Fogelin, Conversation with the Author at Yale Univ. (Jan. 1976).
60. PLATO, LYSIS, reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO INCLUDING LETTERS

145-68 (J. Wright trans., Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1973).
The dialogue can be a bit perplexing for some present-day readers. Id. at 145.
61. Seeid. at147.
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However, Socrates disparages this sexual love as true friendship 62 and
proceeds to disprove many commonly held views of friendship. According
to Socrates, it is not a relationship of mere expedience, 63 nor is it a
relationship based on money-a friend is more dear than "all the gold in
Darius." 64
Plato's dialogue describes friendship as a transcendental quality.6 5 This
dialogue may well have given rise to the common term, "Platonic love"-a
thing superior to mere physical love.66
Friends do not injure one another.67 Friends may or may not be alike in
personality and other attributes. 68 Generally friends "assist" one another, but
not always. 69 Friendship is not a mere physical thing, and thus is difficult to
define in physical terms.70 In short, it is a kind of love.7' In the context of
Plato's other work, it is a "form" or "idea." It is a value that has a
72
transcendental, spiritual, and permanent basis.
At the very least, if Plato is correct, this relationship known as
friendship is every bit as intimate as love, marriage, or business. Thus, if we
make standards on impartiality that exclude friendship, this would be a gross
error. Impartial judges do not decide cases involving friends, and the
statutory and case standards should reflect this. In truth and fact, friendship
73
is a more intimate relationship than marriage, blood, or money!
B. DictionaryDefinition
It is somewhat troubling that different dictionaries define the same word
differently. In seeking a basic dictionary definition, this author hunted
countless dictionaries hoping to find the most reliable one. Language

62. See id. at 149.
63. See id. at 153.
64. See id. at 154.
65. See id. at 157.
66. If this is true, and it probably is, then all of the recusal/disqualification rules when physical
love (as in marriage) is present are exposed for what they are-incomplete rules of appropriate
recusal, at best.
67. PLATO, supra note 60, at 157.
68. See id. at157-59.
69. See id. at 159-60. Incidentally, one public figure, who is an influential acquaintance of the
author, described friends as those who do not merely promise favors, but do them. He requested not
to be named-which also shows something.
70. See id. at162.
71. See id. at 166-68.
72. See generally id. (discussing the nature of friendship).
73. The argument that too many judges would have to be recused because of friendships truly
does not apply because most people have very few friends. On the contrary, they have many more
family and business interests, and these do mandate recusal.
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changes, and the author considered this in his quest to find a correct,
accurate, and current dictionary definition.
For example, although the term "metamorphosis" is ancient, the term
"morph" has become commonplace. Surprisingly, many a new dictionary
does not include this word (meaning change, usually with technological
implications). However, the 2002 version of Webster's Dictionary, Collins
Gem New Edition, included the word morph.74

Hoping that the differences do not matter or matter much, let us turn to
this dictionary's definition of friend: "one well known to another and
regarded with affection and loyalty; intimate associate; supporter ....
Once again, we find, although with less philosophical brilliance, a concrete,
tangible, and definable example of one who is partial,whose impartiality
not only might reasonably be questioned,76 but certainly should be

questioned!
Thus, the conclusion reached from a common dictionary is that the term
"friend" is definable and should be among the listed factors for mandatory
judicial recusal.
C. Noteworthy Alternate Definitions ofFriendship

Zeno, the great Greek philosopher, defined friend as the alter ego of
oneself." Can there be a more succinct definition of bias than favoring
oneself?
In one of the most famous closing arguments, alluding to friendship,
George Graham Vest stated:
The one absolutely unselfish friend that man can have in this selfish
world, the one that never deserts him, the one that never proves
ungrateful or treacherous .... [This one] stands by him in
prosperity and poverty, in health and sickness. He will sleep on the
cold ground where the wintry winds blow and the snow drives
fiercely, if only he may be near [his friend]. He will kiss the hand
that has no food to offer; he will lick the wounds and sores that

74. COLLINS GEM WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 49, at 355. I leave to the reader to verify
all the many dictionaries that exclude this now common term.
75. Id. at 227. This is the entire definition.
76. See ABA

MODEL

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Canon

3E (2003), available at

http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/canon_3.html.
77. "To the question 'Who is a friend?' [Zeno's] answer was, 'A second self (alter ego).'

2

DIOGENES LAERTIUS, LIVES OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS 135 (R.D. Hicks trans., 1925).
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come in encounter with the roughness of the world. He guards the
sleep of his pauper [friend] as if he were a prince. When all
other[s] ...

desert he remains.

When riches take wings and

reputation falls to pieces, he is as constant in his love as the sun in
its journey through the heavens. 'T
Vest's quote refers, incidentally, to the canine friend, the dog. 79 But,
Vest's and this author's point is to illustrate the quality of extreme loyalty.
Professor Charles Fried defines a friend as one who acts in the interests
of another, over his or her own.80 This is almost identical to the definition
offered by Zeno. 81 Fried offers his definition as the root of the lawyer-client
relationship. 2 The lawyer-client relationship is, most obviously, one
characterized by partiality and loyalty.83 No one would argue a lawyer could
be a lawyer and a judge on the same
matter. In fact, full-time judges are
84
precluded from practicing law at all.
Professors Freedman and Smith, relying on the dictionary definition,
define friendship as one person being "attached" to another. 85 These authors
then make a distinction between a "close" friendship and
an ordinary
87
friendship. 86 This author does not find this definition helpful.
In conclusion, friendship is quite definable, and is, for the most part, a
recognized relationship that is similarly defined in disparate and varied
sources. Friendship is loyalty, transcending and superseding most demands
that life places on the friend.

78. George Graham Vest, Address to Jury, Burden v. Homsby, (Warrensburg, Mo. 1870), in
EDWIN M.C. FRENCH, SENATOR VEST: CHAMPION OF THE DOG 34 (1930), quoted in FRED R.

SHAPIRO, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 10 (1993).
79. Id.
80. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: the Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1071 (1976). This definition is cited and quoted with approval in
FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 258.
81. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
82. Fried, supra note 80, at 1071.
83. Seeid.atl061.
84. See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4G (2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/canon-4.html.
85. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 258 (citing RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1997)).
86. Id. at 261.
87. Although on any given case of judicial recusal, it appears that this author would agree with
Freedman and Smith. See generally id. at 261-67 (discussing the Scalia case and other related
cases).
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IV.

ALTERNATE REASON FOR EXCLUDING FRIENDSHIP AS A
DISQUALIFICATION/RECUSAL FACTOR: HISTORY

The prior version of the federal disqualification statute, as passed in
1948, read as follows:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in
any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel,
is or has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected
with any party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his
opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding

therein.88

That is, the prior standard for judicial recusal was not objective.8 9
A subjective recusal standard, particularly with a concurrent standard
that it was the duty of judges to hear all cases, 9° meant that only in the most

egregious of circumstances would recusal flow from friendship.
In fact, history does shed light on the matter. First, with this subjective
recusal standard, the self-recused judge would be admitting bias or
prejudice. This admission can be damaging to one's reputation, and is a

difficult thing for most people to admit-particularly a judge, who is
supposed to be impartial by the nature of the job.
Second, there were fewer judges fifty, let alone a hundred, years ago.
So, the ramifications of judicial recusal were greater, i.e., there may not have
been a judge available!
Third, a more distant look at the history of the law evidences a greater
and greater reticence to recuse or disqualify a judge. 9' Our common law
roots, as explained by William Blackstone, indicate that judges could not be
disqualified for any reason. 92 Earlier and other English law did allow
disqualification when there was a financial interest,93-but Blackstone has
always been the most relevant statement of the common law to Americans.9 4
88. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1952) (emphasis added) (amended 1976).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1976) (recusal appropriate when "impartiality might reasonably be
questioned").
90. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 258-67.
91. Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the FederalAppellate Courts, 87 IOWA L.
REv. 1213, 1223 (2002).
92. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 361 (William D.

Lewis ed. 1922), cited in Bassett, supra note 91, at 1223.
93. Id.
94. Volume IV of his treatise is our American criminal law common law. See generally JEREMY
M. MILLER, supra note 42.
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Eighteenth century United States history shows a slow, grudging, and
specific-only willingness to expand the recusal factors. For example, in
1792, Congress expanded mandatory recusal to include a direct financial
interest of the judge. 95 In 1891, judges were precluded from hearing appeals
in which they were the trial judge.96 And in 1911, judicial recusal was
party to the litigation
expanded to include when the judge was an interested
97
or related to a party involved in the litigation.
The pre-1974 law, using the subjective recusal standard, and delineating
only a few reasons for recusal led, not surprisingly, to few cases of recusal.
Let us focus more now on the subjective standard and a sampling of cases it
produced. Some of these cases are cited in Justice Scalia's Memorandum in
Cheney v. United States District Courtfor the Districtof Columbia.98
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,99 a 1952 case, President
Truman's seizure of steel mills was challenged. 00 Chief Justice Vinson
played poker regularly with President Truman, and no recusal was
Associate Justice Holmes was friends with President Theodore
obtained.'
Roosevelt, yet did not recuse himself in Northern Securities Co. v. United
States, 0 2 a 1904 case involving the President's trust-busting.l0 3
Justice Scalia does not cite the Marshall-Jefferson incident mentioned
above,'1 4 but does cite President John Quincy Adams' socializing with
justices, and Justice Byron White skiing with Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy (when obviously many cases from the Justice Department were
before the High Court).'0 5
As correctly pointed out by Freedman and Smith, however, the law of
recusal and disqualification was quite different then. 10 6 First, the recusal
standard was based on the judge's own subjective opinion.'0 7 If the judge
thought he or she could be impartial, he or she was expected to hear the
case. 108

95. Bassett, supranote 91, at 1223 (citing Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278).

96. Id. at 1223 (citing Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 3, 26 Stat. 826 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 47 (2000)).

97. Id. at 1224 (citing 46 Cong. Rec. H2626-27 (1911)).
98. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the D.C., 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (mem. of Justice Scalia),
availableat http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/scotus/chny31804jsmem.pdf.

99.
100.
101.
102.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Id. at 582.
Cheney, 541 U.S. at 917 (mem. of Justice Scalia).
N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).

103. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 917 (mem. of Justice Scalia).
104. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.

105. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 917 (mem. of Justice Scalia); see also FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note
22, at 265.
106. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 265.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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Additionally, with the present-day recusal statute and the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct-which both voluminously list the reasons for recusal and
do not list "friendship"--an "originalist" or strict constructionist. 9 judge
like Antonin Scalia would feel compelled not to expand the law as written.
Certainly the argument can be made that the objective recusal standard is a
catch-all that mandates more recusals. But since it failed to list "friendship"
among its many factors,"0 Justice Scalia is probably correct that his recusal
was not necessary-though it is a close call."'
This section goes a long way in explaining what appears to be an
obvious error by Justice Scalia, and in explaining the indignant tone of his
brief.
V.

TREATISE AUTHORITY ON JUDICIAL RECUSAL BASED ON FRIENDSHIP

The most amazing discovery regarding research into legal ethics,
professional responsibility, and judicial ethics treatises is the paucity of
discussion regarding the need (or lack thereof) for judges to recuse
themselves (or be involuntarily disqualified) based on being a friend of an
interested party or lawyer.
For example, Professor Charles W. Wolfram's classic treatise makes no
mention of this particular issue at all." 2 In fairness to Professor Wolfram,
the major thrust of his classic is the ethical mandates and aspirations of
lawyers' 3-but judges and recusal are discussed often, although not with a
mention of the friendship factor.
Professor (and Dean) Freedman, in his earlier work, which was quite
brave, and often controversial, made no reference to judicial recusal based
on friendship. 1 4 The latest edition corrects this flaw," 5 but full development
of this issue is overdue.
109. That is, a judge who prides himself on not usurping the intent of the Framers of the law at
issue. See generally JEREMY M. MILLER, SUM AND SUBSTANCE: JURISPRUDENCE (West Publishing

1996).
110. See
ABA
MODEL
CODE
OF
JUDICIAL
CONDUCT
(2003),
available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/toc.html.
11. See infra Part XII. Note, however, that it would not be a close call under the older subjective
standard.
112. See generally CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (1986).
113. Id.
114. See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM
(1975); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS (1990). Freedman failed to
reference judicial recusal based on friendship despite presenting other controversial positions such as
his non-adopted, but groundbreaking view that lawyers should allow and assist in a client's intended
perjury.

Similarly, Professors Hazard and Hodes, in their well-respected treatise,

are silent on this issue." 6 Of course, the Justice Scalia case made conscious
what was hidden for too long. In any case, the thesis of this article is that a
standard is both necessary and practical.
The American Law Institute has promulgated a Restatement on legal

ethics entitled "The Law Governing Lawyers." ' 1 7 Although its focus is on
the lawyer as adversary, there are numerous references to judges throughout
the treatise. 1 8 As a restatement, and in its defense, there is no statement
indicating that recusal is advisable in even some cases of close friendship
between the judge and a party or a lawyer." 9

A typical law casebook, although devoting a chapter to judicial ethics,
avoids or ignores the topic of recusal based on friendship.' 2 °
All of this may change after the celebrated and castigated Justice Scalia
case, 12 1 but, with the exception of the ever-brave Freedman, the topic has
been either intentionally or accidentally avoided in the treatise law.
VI.

THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL RECUSAL STATUTE

The federal judicial recusal statute is, of course, the applicable federal

122
statutory law on when a judge must or should recuse himself or herself.

28 U.S.C. § 455 sets out the standards. 123 This statute is modeled after the

American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct, but its
importance mandates quoting it in its entirety:

115. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 261-67 (3d ed. 2004)
(devoting an entire section, § 9.10, to criticizing Justice Scalia's position).
116. See generally GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
(3d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2005).
117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000).
118. See generallyid.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., RICHARD C. WYDICK ET AL., CALIFORNIA LEGAL ETHICS (4th ed. 2003).
121. See infra Part XII.
122. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2004). Under § 451, this statute is binding on all federal judges--except, as
a practical matter, those of the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 451 (2004). While
Supreme Court Justices are technically bound by this statute, because they are the highest court of
the land there is no avenue to appeal their decisions regarding their own non-recusal. Additionally,
each U.S. Supreme Court Justice makes his or her own decision regarding the necessity of recusal.
This is probably a good rule, because putting recusal to a High Court vote might not only destroy the
necessary collegiality of that small group, but might also turn recusal into a filibuster-type of
political maneuvering. It is hoped and expected that with more explicit standards on friendship
recusal, the High Court Justices will follow this rule. If not, there remains the near-impotent remedy
of impeachment and removal from office.
123. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2004).
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§ 455. Disqualification ofjustice, judge, or magistrate judge
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter
in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced
law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the
matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness
concerning it;

(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in
such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material
witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion
concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his
spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial
interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of
relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or
trustee of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material
witness in the proceeding.

(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary
financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself
about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor
children residing in his household.
(d) For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases
shall have the meaning indicated:
(1) "proceeding" includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or
other stages of litigation;
(2) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil
law system;
(3) "fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor,
administrator, trustee, and guardian;
(4) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal or equitable
interest, however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or
other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:
(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that
holds securities is not a "financial interest" in such
securities unless the judge participates in the management
of the fund;
(ii) An office in an educational, religious, charitable,
fraternal, or civic organization is not a "financial interest"
in securities held by the organization;
(iii) The proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual
insurance company, of a depositor in a mutual savings
association, or a similar proprietary interest, is a "financial
interest" in the organization only if the outcome of the
proceeding could substantially affect the value of the
interest;
(iv) Ownership of government securities is a "financial
interest" in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding
could substantially affect the value of the securities.
(e) No justice, judge, or magistrate judge shall accept from the
parties to the proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification
enumerated in subsection (b). Where the ground for disqualification
arises only under subsection (a), waiver may be accepted provided it
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is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for
disqualification.
(f) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if any
justice, judge, magistrate judge, or bankruptcy judge to whom a
matter has been assigned would be disqualified, after substantial
judicial time has been devoted to the matter, because of the
appearance or discovery, after the matter was assigned to him or
her, that he or she individually or as a fiduciary, or his or her spouse
or minor child residing in his or her household, has a financial
interest in a party (other than an interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome), disqualification is not required if the
justice, judge, magistrate judge, bankruptcy judge, spouse or minor
child, as the case may be, divests himself or herself
2 4 of the interest
that provides the grounds for the disqualification. 1
Like the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the federal judicial
recusal statute focuses on money interest, family interests, and prior
relations with interested parties when having served as a lawyer.1 25 It was
quoted in its entirety to show that while it is quite explicit, if not verbose, it
omits even a hint of recusal based on friendship. This specificity, even with
its objective impartiality standard, leaves the door open to non-recusal based
26
on friendship. Justice Scalia walked through that door, albeit incorrectly.1
Friendship recusal is not the statute's only flaw. In passing, it is also
interesting to note, with requisite respect, that it is sloppily drafted. For
example, subsection (f) uses the presently preferred gender neutral language,
e.g., "he or she" or "himself or herself," whereas
the remainder of the statute
17
uses the older "he" or "himself' language.
VII.

LEADING UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES ON JUDICIAL
RECUSAL

In this survey section, the leading pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme
Court regarding judicial recusal will be set out chronologically. These are
interesting, particularly in their creation of the so-called "extrajudicial

124.
125.
126.
127.
show

Id.
See generally id.
See infra Part XII.
See generally 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2004). This is mentioned not as a cheap shot, but rather to
that, unfortunately, the statute was not well thought out, nor was it proofread well.
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source" doctrine, but there is almost perfect silence on the proposed, muchneeded friendship standard.
A. Berger et al. v. United States
In Berger v. United States,'2 8 a 1921 case, a motion was filed to recuse
the judge based on alleged antipathy the judge had against certain
defendants.2 9 Alternately stated, recusal was requested because the judge
was an enemy of some of the defendants. 3 '
The allegation was that Judge Kenesaw Mountain Lewis had a prejudice
against Germans.' 3' Quoting the judge, "Their [German] hearts are reeking
with disloyalty.... [They] have the interests of the enemy at heart."'3 2 Of
course these views were given with the backdrop of World War I.
Ultimately, it was concluded that he could not fairly preside over the murder
trial. 33
The case is significant in several respects. It gives an example of both
subjective and objective partiality. Further, the bias or prejudice is not based
on money or blood, but on emotional ties (and lack thereof).13 4 Finally, the
recusal is mandated not by what the judge did or did 3not
do during the trial
5
or pretrial, but by an extrajudicial (emotional) source.1
B.

United States v. Grinnell Corp.

In United States v. Grinnell Corp.,36 a 1966 case, the defendants filed a
motion to disqualify the judge. 13 7 The subject of the case was alleged
restraint of trade. 38 The argument for disqualification arose from the
following dialogue:

128. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
129. Id. at28-29.
130. Id. Without spoiling the conclusion, it is interesting to note that enmity is a valid ground for
recusal-provided the "enemy" relationship is not a result of fierce in-court proceedings. Certainly,
if there can be an enemy standard, which there is, there can be a friendship standard, which there is
not. The two terms (friend and enemy) are opposites-both indicating bias and/or prejudice; and if
one has a standard, the other should.
131. Id. at 28.
132. Id. at 28-29.
133. Id. at 36.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
137. Id. at 582.
138. Id. at 566.
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[MR. MCINERNEY.]

[I]f your Honor would indicate the relief that

might be appropriate in this case that would help both sides to come
to a better understanding....
THE COURT. I don't think it would help very much.
MR. MCINERNEY. Well, your Honor, I think it would help both the
plaintiff and the defendants to know what is really at stake here in
this trial.
THE COURT. I assure you that you would not be helped by anything
I would say. You would do better to get together with the
government
rather than run the risk of what I would say from what I
139
have seen.
The defendants, a short while later, requested a postponement of the
trial, which was denied by the judge. 140 And the judge commented, "I can't
understand frankly why you don't realize that you have forced me to look at
the documents in this case, which I dislike doing in advance
of trial ... [M]y
14
views are more extreme than those of the government.'' 1
The defendants then moved to disqualify the judge. 142 The motion was
denied, 143 and the High Court reasoned that, "The alleged bias and prejudice
to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an
opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from
his participation in the case." 1" Thus, disqualification based on the socalled extra-judicial source doctrine was created. 145 Although it is hoped
that judicial demeanor will be calm during trial, spirited exchanges between
the judge and counsel are not grounds for disqualification.

139. Id. at 581.
140. Id. at 582.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 582-83.
144. Id. at 583 (citing Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 31 (1921)).
145. See discussion infra Part VII.G. This doctrine could easily be extended to friendship,
although as yet, it has not been.
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C.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire andIts Progeny

In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,146 a 1971 case, an attorney general who
was involved in the investigation of a criminal case issued a warrant. 4 7 This
violated the requirement that warrants issue from "neutral and detached"
magistrates.14 8 Incidentally, the lack of a neutral and detached magistrate,49
i.e., an impartial judge, is not subject to harmless error analysis.
Therefore, Coolidge presented a clear Fourth Amendment violation.
The progeny of cases following Coolidge indicate that a judge being
paid extra for warrants issued (and not being paid for warrants not issued)
violates this impartiality aspect of the Fourth Amendment.' 5
Also,
participating
in
the
criminal
investigation
disqualifies
a
judge
from
issuing
a
5
warrant.'1
The mandate of impartiality of judges is, in fact, enshrined in at least
three clauses of the U.S. Constitution: The Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause, The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and the Fourth
Amendment. Additionally, it appears the easiest test to meet is the Fourth
Amendment standard, which precludes the judge from prior involvement in
investigations. 152 It is submitted that this more rigorous approach is more
appropriate.
D. United States v. Will
In United States v. Will, 53 a 1980 case, the familiar "necessity doctrine"
was explained. Several federal district judges filed a class action suit against
the United States in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
arguing for increased salaries. 51 4 The High Court reasoned that in such a suit
where all or most judges have a pecuniary interest, although a pecuniary
interest would generally mandate disqualification, it does not when the body
of partial judges is too large. 155 Were there recusal, judges themselves
would be deprived of their day in court and might be subject to great

146. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
147. Id. at 450.
148. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
149. Harmless errors cannot be "structural," e.g., a partial judge. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279, 309 (1991).
150. Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1977).
151. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 328 (1979).
152. See id.
153. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
154. Id. at 209.
155. Seeid. at216-17.
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injustices. 56 The High57Court added that § 455 of the recusal statute merely
sets up a presumption.1
The Court is probably correct, and, although we do perceive a theme of
self-preservation and self-protection of judges by judges for judges, this case
does foreshadow 5 the
very real problem of friendship recusal, and Justice
8
Scalia's conduct.'
E. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie
In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie,159 a 1986 case, an Alabama judge
wrote the opinion and cast the deciding vote on an insurance bad faith
claim.160 The problems were that the judge himself had a claim pending on a
similar issue, and the law was unsettled.' 6' Under these circumstances, his
impartiality could reasonably be questioned. 62 The High Court vacated the
63
Alabama Supreme Court holding, and ordered a new appeal.
In language of constitutional dimension, the High Court wrote, "We
conclude that Justice Embry's participation in this case violated appellant's
' 64
due process rights . . . . '[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice.""
The Court indicated that the older test for mandatory judicial recusal, i.e.,
that the judge be actually (subjectively) biased or prejudiced, was no longer
the law. 65 The standard for judicial recusal had been expanded. 66 That, in
this author's opinion, is a good thing and may foreshadow an expansion to
67
include the friendship standard proposed in this paper.
F. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisitions Corp.

In Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisitions Corp.,168 a 1988 case, the
judge was a board member of an entity seeking to acquire a parcel of land

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Seeid. at216.
See infra Part XII.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
Id. at 816-18.
Id. at823-24.
Id.
Id.
at 828.
Id. at 825 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
Id.
See Aetna Life Ins. Co., 475 U.S. at 825.
See discussion infra Part XIII.
Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisitions Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
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from the petitioner. 169 The respondent, also wishing to purchase that parcel
of land, sought to have the judge disqualified under 28 U.S.C. § 455. 170 The
judge took part in several of the board meetings regarding this purchase. 7
The judge ruled in favor of his board, under disputed facts. 17 2 Refusing
to find that § 455 requires "scienter," i.e., actual knowledge and actual
partiality, the High Court ruled that not only was disqualification mandated,
but that the remedy was a new trial. 17 3 Citing favorably our previous case,
71 4
the Court found that when "impartiality might reasonably be questioned"'
and the judge decides the case anyway, 7there is a Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause violation.1
G. Liteky v. United States
In Liteky v. United States,176 a 1994 case, and the final case in this
survey section on High Court jurisprudence on judicial recusal, a judge was
asked to recuse himself based on angry in-court exchanges between himself
177
and one of the defendants at a somewhat related trial that occurred prior.
This is the definitive case on the extra-judicial source doctrine.
This doctrine states that even in fiery trials in which the judge
exchanges words with a lawyer or party, there are no grounds for recusal. 75
As Justice Scalia noted in his opinion, "If the judge did not form judgments
of the actors79in those court-house dramas called trials, he could never render
decisions.'0
The extrajudicial source doctrine, prior to Liteky, had been thought to
apply only to exchanges during that particular trial. Liteky extended it to
say, essentially, that each trial's beginning is a blank slate, and alleged
grudges from previous trials are not grounds for recusal.' 80
Let us examine the Liteky facts more closely. Relying on 28 U.S.C §
455(a), the petitioners moved to remove the district judge because he
presided over a prior trial where one of the petitioners (Bourgeois) was a

169. Id. at 850.
170. Id. at 850-52.
171. Id. at 853-55.
172. Id. at 855.
173. Id. at 859-63; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (allows overturning a judgment in exceptional
cases like this one).
174. 23 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2004).
175. Litjeberg, 486 U.S. at 865 n.12 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825
(1986)).
176. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
177. Id. at 542.
178. Id. at 550-51.
179. Id. at 551 (quoting In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1943)).
180. See id.
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defendant. 18 1 Quoting Justice Scalia, "Petitioners claimed that recusal was
required in the present case because the judge had displayed 'impatience,
disregard for the defense and 8 animosity' toward Bourgeois, Bourgeois'
codefendants, and their beliefs."' 1
Among other things, the judge stated that "closing argument was not a
time for 'making a speech' in a 'political forum."", 183 The extrajudicial
source doctrine mandates recusal when the judge's motives of bias or
prejudice are not based on the trial itself.' 84 But, this case posed a new
"spin," as it were, on the extrajudicial source doctrine-what if the judge
held a grudge from a prior trial?
Citing to the 1821 United States law, and the prior version of § 455,
recusal was mandated only when the judge, in his or her own opinion
believed that his or her participation as judge would be improper.185 Justice
Scalia correctly points out that recusal bases were expanded by the present
statute and that the standard, which was subjective, became objective
by
' 86
including the phrase, "impartiality might reasonably be questioned.'
187
Justice Scalia, after a typically erudite and intellectual discussion,
concludes that "[t]o demand the sort of 'child-like innocence' that
elimination of the 'extrajudicial source' limitation would require is not
reasonable."'188 The Justice writes beautifully, but in exaggerating the
opposition's non-recusal standard to "child-like innocence,"'' 89 he does
disservice to the law of the land, and foreshadows his own error in the
Cheney case. 190 In short, impartiality will not reasonably be questioned with
adult-like innocence, or even reasonably moderate open-mindedness.191
Justice Scalia correctly reasons that although objective (reasonable
person) impartiality is the benchmark, if the judge is subjectively partial,
that remains a ground for recusal.192 Then the Justice concludes that the

181. Id. at 542.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 550-51.
185. Id. at 546.
186. Id. at 548.
187. For example, although agreeing that "personal" judicial bias is never appropriate, Justice
Scalia then states that "official" judicial bias might be appropriate. Id. at 549-50. However, he
views the distinction as an oversimplification.
188. Id. at 552.
189. Id.
190. See discussion infra Part XII.
191. Truly, who can claim "child-like innocence" except very young children?
192. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 553 n.2.

extrajudicial source doctrine includes not only the present trial but all trials
(more accurately and broadly put, "judicial proceedings"). 193
In conclusion to this section, it is clear that the United States Supreme
Court has expanded when recusal is not necessary, and has deemed recusal
necessary only in the most severe of circumstances-i.e., when the judge has
a monetary, family, or career interest, or is acting as a prosecutor or
detective.
VIII. THE VERY FEW EXISTING LOWER COURT CASES ON FRIENDSHIP
RECUSAL

The leading lower court case on friendship recusal is United States v.
Murphy, a 1985 case from the Seventh Circuit. 194 In that case, the trial judge
was close friends with the prosecutor and vacationed with this prosecutor
immediately after the trial. 95 The Seventh Circuit held that, absent a
showing of96 actual impropriety (which there was not), recusal was not
mandated. 1
In re United States 97 set out a compelling fact pattern for judicial
recusal based on friendship. In that case, the trial judge had a close and
personal friendship with the defendant. 98 The judge was, in fact, appointed
judge by the defendant and had represented the defendant years earlier. 99
After reviewing the record, and taking into account the presumption that
judges should not be disqualified and that there was no automatic friendship
recusal standard, the court denied the requested disqualification.2 ° °
The result was identical in Parrish v. Board of Commissioners of
Alabama State Bar, a 1975 case. 201 In that case, it was alleged that the judge
was friends with a defense counsel and some defense witnesses. 2°2 The case
is more troubling in that the judge was president of a discriminatory bar
association while overseeing a case where discrimination was the main
issue. 203

193. Id. at 556.
194. United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985).
195. Id. at 1536.
196. Id. at 1536-37.
197. In re United States, 666 F.2d 690 (1st Cir. 1981).
198. Id. at 691.
199. Id. at 691-92.
200. Id. at 696-99.
201. Parrish v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 524 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1975).
202. Id. at 102.
203. Id. at 101. In the case in question, the issue was whether the Alabama Bar Examination was
discriminatory, and this judge had been president of a bar group that banned membership to AfricanAmerican lawyers. Id. at 99, 101.
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The only anomaly in this line of cases is United States v. Tucker,2 4
which is not a case at all, but rather a request by then Independent Counsel
Kenneth Starr to have a different judge assigned to the investigation of
Arkansas officials after the presiding judge dismissed the indictment.10 5 The
appellate court granted the request based on the judge's statement that he
would recuse himself if President Clinton were involved.0 6
There are other tangentially-related cases, 207 but there are scant few on
friendship, and even those indicate that it is not to be a forceful factor in
recusal.

IX. A BRIEF SURVEY OF NINTH CIRCUIT CASES
A survey of other lower federal court cases, particularly of the Ninth
Circuit, shows a paucity of recusal cases and an even greater lack of
discussion regarding recusal based on friendship.208 For example, in In re
Webster,2 °9 the petitioner sought reversal of a disbarment order because of
an alleged bias of the judge.2" ° Reasoning that in-court antagonism is
generally not enough to mandate recusal (the "extrajudicial source"
doctrine), the court held recusal unnecessary.2 1'
21 2
it was indicated in a newspaper article
In United States v. Olander,
that the judge was disappointed that the state was not enforcing his
judgment.21 3 Investigation of this newspaper article revealed that the report
was not substantiated and was, in fact, false.2t 4
The Olander court focused on 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1), which states that a
judge should recuse himself or herself if "he has a personal bias or prejudice
" Although it would be hoped that this standard
concerning a party. ...,,2

204. United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313 (8th Cir. 1996).
205. Id. at 1322.
206. Id. at 1322-23.
207. See, e.g., Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 676, 683 (7th Cir. 1983) (nonfriend arbiter's non-disclosure of distant business ties do not make proceeding infirm).
208. See discussion supra Part VIII.
209. In re Webster, 382 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1967).
210. Id. at 82.
211. Id. at 82-83.
212. United States v. Olander, 584 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1978).
213. Id. at 882-83.
214. Id. at 883-84.
215. Id. at 882 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (1976)).
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would cover friendship, at best it covers enemy status, 2and
that is a difficult
16

standard to meet, which in fact was not met in this case.

217
In United States v. Carignan,
the court indicates that "bias for or

against an attorney might be so virulent as to amount to bias for or against
the party, 218 but characterizes the alleged bias here a mere "squabble '219
that occurred four years prior, and thus was not worthy of recusal. 22 ' The

pattern is clear, and that pattern indicates non-recusal. Thus, at the least, a
friendship (bias) standard needs to be overtly added to existing law.
However, this brief survey section will continue.
What if, in a prior related proceeding, the judge hears evidence which

turns out to be inadmissible in the latter proceeding? Is recusal mandated?
That was the key issue in United States v. Winston.22' The court held recusal

unnecessary, because this showed neither bias, prejudice, nor a reasonable
2 23
doubt of impartiality. 222 The claim was not based on an extrajudicial bias.
Judges are often exposed to evidence that is inadmissible.
Similarly, in United States v. Sibla,224 the judge remarked, during the
course of the judicial proceedings, that some of the defendant's claims were
frivolous.225 Since this was not an extrajudicial source bias, and was within
the realm of the "drama" of trial, the recusal was denied. 26
In the rather interesting fact pattern of United States v. Conforte,227 the

judge, outside of court, recommended on two occasions the denial of social
and charitable applications based on the petitioner's prior felony convictions

216. Id. at 883.
217. United States v. Carignan, 600 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1979).
218. Id. at 764.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. United States v. Winston, 613 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1980).
222. Id. at 222.
223. See id. at 223; see also King v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 16 F.3d 992 (9th
Cir. 1994) (judicial recusal improper because no extrajudicial prejudice shown); Duckworth v. Dep't
of Navy, 974 F.2d 1140, 1143 (9th Cir. 1992) (judge acting administratively, but in official capacity,
is not an extrajudicial source); Pau v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1991)
(judge's comment that he had to "conduct a law school class" to a lawyer held to be not
extrajudicial, and not sufficiently biased to mandate recusal); United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934,
939 (9th Cir. 1986) (recusal inappropriate when two of the three alleged grounds for recusal were
not extrajudicial and the third was too void to tell); Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir.
1984) (a judge's previous adverse judgment against a party is not an extrajudicial source and not
disqualifying); United States v. Nelson, 718 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 1983) (prior trial with same
judge is not an extrajudicial source); Trotter v. Int'l Longshoreman's and Warehouseman's Union,
704 F.2d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1983) (although the judge has a self-imposed duty to recuse-such is
not present when there is a judicial source).
224. United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1980).
225. Id. at 866.
226. Id. at 867-68.
227. United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1980).

[Vol. 33: 575, 2006]

JudicialRecusal and Disqualification
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

and association with the infamous brothel, the Mustang Ranch.228 This is
clearly an extrajudicial source, shows prejudice, and is in error. It also
shows the loathing that judges feel when they "kick off' one another from
cases. The standards need to be rebuilt, with a focus on this weakness.
Granted, the extrajudicial source doctrine is necessary and solves most of the
enemy problems-but it does not touch the issue of friendship.
A survey of other Ninth Circuit cases indicates focus on money
interests, 229 family interests, 230 prior or present involvement in the case, 23 1
and incompetence.2 32 Friendship is an ignored issue.233
X.

STATE TREATMENT OF FRIENDSHIP RECUSAL: CALIFORNIA

Because most states have adopted the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct,23 4 it is of little surprise that the most fertile development of recusal

228. Id. at 878.
229. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 119 F.3d 1377 (9th Cir. 1997) (de minimis financial
interest of judge in ownership of stock of company that was a victim of the defendant's alleged
crime does not mandate recusal); United States v. Feldman, 983 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1992) (judge's
financial interest based on bank merger mandates recusal); Davis v. Xerox, 811 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir.
1987) (judge's subjective lack of awareness of some financial interest does not mandate vacating
judgment).
230. See, e.g., Mangini v. United States, 314 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (discovery that brother-inlaw on opposing side should have led to recusal, and leads to vacating judgment); In re Bernard, 31
F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 1994) (discovery that judge's spouse is a U.S. trustee with minimal impact does
not mandate recusal).
231. See, e.g., United States v. Silver, 245 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2001) (the fact that the judge served
as a prosecutor many years prior may allow non-recusal); First Interstate Bank of Ariz. v. Murphy,
Weir & Butler, 210 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2000) (future employment of employee ofjudge, on one side,
does not automatically mandate judicial recusal); United States v. Arnpreister, 37 F.3d 466 (9th Cir.
1994) (judge serving as prosecutor and investigator on the case, even though distant, mandates his
recusal after elevation to the bench and vacating judgment of guilty); Preston v. United States, 923
F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1991) (former legal associate involvement on opposing side mandates vacating
judgment).
232. See, e.g., United States v. Jaramillo, 745 F.2d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1984) (judge's own
criminal indictment is grounds for recusal).
233. Other federal circuit courts have reached similar results. See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, 241
F.3d 194, 206 (2d Cir. 2001) (judge being given course tuition and expenses may be grounds for
disqualification); Republic of Panama v. Am. Tobacco Co., 217 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2000) (judge
being listed, albeit incorrectly, on related amicus brief is grounds for disqualification); Nichols v.
Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 352 (10th Cir. 1995) (judge's chambers being bombed and staff member's injury
is grounds for recusal); United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 995 (10th Cir. 1993) (judge's television
statement giving opinion of pending case is grounds for recusal); United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d
732, 745 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (judicial statement doubting own ability to be impartial is grounds for
disqualification). These cases illustrate that recusal is possible-but the friendship route is almost
impossible.
234. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 236 n.31.
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and disqualification standards 235 has been under federal law. Nevertheless,

let us take a brief look at the statutory and case standards of our most
populous state, California.
Chapter seven of the California Code of Civil Procedure, section
170.1,236 essentially follows the ABA approach.23 7 That is, disqualification
is mandated when the judge had a prior professional relationship with the
case, is related to a party or attorney by blood, has a financial interest, or the
judge is impaired.131 Part (a)(6)(A)-(B) of this section reads:

For any reason:
(i) The judge believes his or her recusal would further the interests
of justice.
(ii) The judge believes there is a substantial doubt as to his or her
capacity to be impartial.
(iii) A person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt
that the judge would be able to be impartial.
(B) Bias or prejudice towards a lawyer in the proceeding may be
grounds for disqualification.239

Although a plain reading of this section leaves the door open, as it were, for
friendship recusal, there is no specific provision on point-just like the
federal law.24 °

235. As stated previously, and as is obvious from the words' plain meanings, recusal is voluntary
disqualification by the judge and disqualification is when a higher court requires the judge to
withdraw. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text. For purposes of the thesis of this paper, the
distinction is not necessary-particularly because United States Supreme Court Justices can never be
forced to disqualify themselves. It is their own decision. If there is a remedy at all, it is public
disrespect and congressional impeachment. However, neither of these appear to carry much force.
236. See generally CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 170.1 (West 2005) (setting out California's standard
for judicial recusal).
237. See discussion supra Part II.
238. § 170.1.
239. Id. at § 170.1(a)(6)(A)-(B). The catch-all objective standard is the same as the federal and
Model Code "impartiality might reasonably be questioned" test. See Robertson v. California, 498
U.S. 1004, 1006 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (equating California's objective standard with 28
U.S.C. § 455(a)).
240. See discussion supra Part VI. In passing, it should be noted that California has a "watchdog"
Commission on Judicial Performance and a monitoring provision at Rule 112 of same. See
COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, RULES OF THE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE

RULE 112 (2005), availableat http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/rules.htm.
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A fair sampling of California cases reveals nothing remarkablecertainly no groundbreaking rules on judicial recusal or disqualification
based on friendship. For example, if the judge is related to a party in241a
business or familial manner, the judge must recuse himself or herself.
When the judge's wife had worked for the plaintiff corporation six years
earlier, although a close call, disqualification based on partiality was not

necessary.242 The choice of the judge hearing the case is presumptively
valid.243 Judicial expressions of frustration at a litigant or attorney do not
lead to a conclusion of a lack of impartiality. 244 This is California applying
the extrajudicial source doctrine.
Judges are not immune from disqualification. For example, a judge's
error as to the law, such as failure to respond to a timely disqualification
motion,245 or not advising a probationer of his rights, 46 can be grounds for

disqualification. The law is nearly silent on friendship recusal. Other states'
cases are similar.2

47

XI. LAW REVIEW LACK OF Focus ON FRIENDSHIP RECUSAL

There are few articles which even tangentially discuss judicial
friendship recusal. Some of these will be analyzed, with appropriate depth,

in this section.
In the most pertinent article, Professor Leslie Abramson argues that

judicial recusal or disqualification should occur:
When a judge presides in a proceeding in which the judge (or the

judge's close relative) and an attorney, party, victim, or witness (or
their close relative) have a social or business relationship or contact,
the judge shall consider recusal, giving appropriate significance to

the following factors: (1) the duration of the relationship or contact;

241. See, e.g., Lynis v. Alturas Sch. Dist., 155 P. 109 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1915).
242. See, e.g., United Farm Workers of Am. v. Superior Court, 216 Cal. Rptr. 4, 6-11 (Ct. App.
1985).
243. See, e.g., Linney v. Turpen, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813, 819-20 (Ct. App. 1996).
244. See, e.g., PBA, LLC v. KPOD, Ltd., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Ct. App. 2003); Roitz v. Coldwell
Banker Residential Brokerage Co., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 85 (Ct. App. 1998).
245. See, e.g., Hemingway v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363 (Ct. App. 2004).
246. See, e.g., In re Wagner, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 201 (Ct. App. 2005).
247. See, e.g., Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 609 A.2d 388 (N.H. 1992) (trial judge a nephew of
senior partner of four related proceedings mandated disqualification); State v. Whitlow, 988 S.W.2d
121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (that victim's son and grandson personally knew, and likely were "friends"
of the judge, does not mandate disqualification).
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(2) the content of any conversation during the relationship or
contact; (3) the nature and circumstances of the relationship or
contact; (4) the frequency of meetings or conversations; (5) the
personal dependence of either on the relationship; (6) whether the
relationship was connected with the subject matter of the
proceeding; (7) in a business relationship, whether the judge
receives preferential treatment not granted to others; (8) whether the
relationship has been the subject of media publicity; and (9)
statements attributable to the judge or any other person about the
relationship.248
Although this approach is better than silence, it has several flaws. It is
as amorphous and thus as impotent as any purported ethical standard could
be. Professor Abramson is aware of this. She writes, "courts correctly
refuse to promulgate per se rules. '2 49 In fact, however, the evolution of both
legal ethics standards and judicial ethics standards have come from the
general and evolved to the specific.250 Where once even a money interest
would not necessarily disqualify a judge, now it will.251
Thus, Professor Abramson adds little to purging judicial decisions based
on friendship bias by this offered approach. Additionally, she obfuscates the
issue by including monetary issues in the same amorphous lump as
friendship ("social") issues.
However, in a respected poll of judges, the judges themselves indicated
that they did, in fact, desire more guidance and specificity in recusal
decisions.2 52 Additionally, although lawyers are trained to offer deference to
judges by calling them "Your Honor," "The Honorable," "Justice," and the
like (their in-court dress, in ancient black robes differentiates them from all

248. Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality
"Might Reasonably Be Questioned", 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 55, 98 (2000). Professor Abramson
is not alone in indicating that the per se rule approach is inappropriate. See, e.g., John Leubsdorf,
Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 240, 283 (1987) (an
interesting and thoughtful piece, but ultimately rejecting a per se ethics approach); Karen Nelson
Moore, Appellate Review of Judicial DisqualificationDecisionsin the FederalCourts, 35 HASTINGS
L.J. 829 (1984); Susan B. Hoekema, Comment, Questioning the Impartiality of Judges:
DisqualifyingFederal DistrictCourt Judges Under 28 U.S.C. §455(a), 60 TEMP. L.Q. 697, 723-24
(1987) (rejecting a delineated per se recusal approach, but noting that the United States Senate was
aware of this potential problem); Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal
Courts, 86 HARV. L. REV. 736 (1973).
249. Abramson, supranote 248, at 97.
250.

See, e.g., DAVID HOFFMAN, RESOLUTIONS IN REGARD TO PROFESSIONAL DEPORTMENT IN A

COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY, ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND THE PROFESSION GENERALLY (2d ed.
1836); WOLFRAM, supra note 112, at 53 & n.20. The first legal ethics codes, including this, were

quite general.
251. See supra notes 7, 125, 229 and accompanying text.
252. See Jona Goldschmidt & Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial Disqualification: What Do Judges
Think?, 80 JUDICATURE Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 68-72.
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others in court proceedings), in fact judges have the very same thinking

processes as lawyers and lay people. 53 If this is true, that is all the more

reason for having a friendship recusal rule. Humans, by their nature, are
predisposed to favoring their friends.

Other writers are aware of the general problem and need for more
recusal, but the issue of this paper is not theirs.254
XII.

A.

THE JUSTICE SCALIA/CHENEY CASE

The Motion to Recuse
In 2004, Alan B. Morrison and the Sierra Club filed a motion to recuse

Associate Justice Antonin Scalia from a case involving alleged impropriety
by Vice President Cheney when he presided over the National Energy Policy
Task Group.255 It was alleged that Vice President Cheney allowed private
citizens to improperly participate and exert influence over the task force, that

253. See Chris Guthrie, Inside the JudicialMind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 829 (2001).
254. See, e.g., Leslie W. Abramson, The Judge's Relative is Affiliated with Counsel of Record:
The EthicalDilemma, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1181 (2004) (showing how easy it is to have specific and
applicable recusal rules); Leslie W. Abramson, Specifying Groundsfor Judicial Disqualificationin
FederalCourts, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1080 (1993) (discussion of possible need for per se recusal
rule for judge's former law clerks); Bassett, supra note 91, at 1213 (a brilliant piece attempting to
solve some of the judicial partiality problems by a peremptory challenge type of procedure); Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, An Open Discussion with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1033
(2004) (an "open discussion" which is not so open as to include friendship recusal); Steven Lubet,
Disqualification of Supreme Court Justices: The Certiorari Conundrum, 80 MINN. L. REV. 657
(1996) (alluding to the particular problems of recusal as applied to U.S. Supreme Court Justices);
Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68 U. CHi. L. REV. 679 (2001) (a thoughtful
piece indicating the unfortunate proximity judges have to politics); Donald C. Nugent, JudicialBias,
42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (1994) (focusing on the negative bias of the judge); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61 (2000) (a
psychological approach); Judith Resnick, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand,
Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579 (2005) (because judging depends on the judge,
selection takes on great importance); Christopher R. Carton, Comment, Disqualifying Federal
Judgesfor Bias: A Consideration of the ExtrajudicialBias Limitationfor DisqualificationUnder 28
U.S.C. §455(a), 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 2057 (1994) (discussion of in-court demeanor generally not
mandating disqualification); Lawrence J. Hand, Jr., Note, Liteky v. United States-Jeopardizing
JudicialIntegrity, 40 Loy. L. REV. 995 (1995) (focusing on the negative bias of judges); Nancy L.
Sholes, Note, JudicialEthics: A Sensitive Subject, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379 (1992) (idealistic
piece focusing on personal integrity); Denelle J. Waynick, Comment, JudicialDisqualification:The
Questfor Impartiality and Integrity, 33 How. L.J. 449 (1991).
255. Motion to Recuse, supra note 17.
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he lied as to such, and thus he became a named party
both in his official
25 6
capacity as Vice Prcsident and in his personal capacity.
The allegation was that Associate Justice Scalia's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned due to his ties to Mr. Cheney." 7 Those ties
included Justice Scalia inviting Mr. Cheney to accompany him on a hunting
trip in Louisiana, with Justice Scalia accepting gratis a one-way flight on
Air Force Two, at Mr. Cheney's offering.258
It was an intimate vacation, and the recusal motion indicates, correctly,
that the press all over the United States had questioned the propriety of
Justice Scalia staying on the case.259
The flight on Air Force Two is worth, at a minimum, a thousand
dollars 2 60 -therefore, there is an obvious recusal factor in the monetary gift
to the judge.261
The motion to recuse argues that were the Vice President simply a
named party, i.e., as sitting Vice President, the result might differ-but he is
alleged to have committed perjury and behaved improperly-so it is
personal.262
The recusal motion argues that mere social acquaintance, e.g.,
attendance at a Christmas or cocktail party, is quite different from a vacation
and paid flight together.2 63
B. Justice Scalia'sResponse
Justice Scalia denied the motion to recuse for many reasons.2 4 He
begins by admitting to having a friendship with Mr. Cheney and that he
suggested a hunting trip together in Louisiana. 265 He continues by stating
that, due to national security, he had to fly on Air Force Two. 266 He also
maintains that he and Mr. Cheney spent no time alone, did not discuss the
case, and that it was not an "intimate setting. ' 267

256. See generally id.
257. Id. at 1-2.
258. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the D.C., 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (mem. of Justice Scalia),
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/scotus/chny31804jsmem.pdf.
259. Motion to Recuse, supra note 17, at 3-6. Perhaps most painful was Tonight Show host Jay
Leno indicating that the Vice President had Scalia in his pocket. Id. at 6.
260. Id. at 6 n.3. Query: What would it sell for on E-Bay?
261. Id.
262. Id. at 9-10.
263. Id. at 10-11.
264. See generally Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the D.C., 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (mem. of Justice
Scalia), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/scotus/chny3I804jsmem.pdf.
265. Id. at 913.
266. Id. at 914.
267. Id. at 915.
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Justice Scalia pierces to the heart of the issue in writing that recusal
could be based only on one fact: "The only possibility is that it would
suggest I am a friend of his. 2 68 Then Justice Scalia dismisses friendship
recusal as having no basis in the law.269 Justice Scalia then goes on to list
other justices who had ties to parties, 7 ° but he ignores the fact that the law
on impartiality was subjective (i.e., the judge was the judge of his or her own
impartiality), and dismisses the fact that Mr. Cheney is more than a named
official whose reputation is being attacked.27 1
Justice Scalia dismisses the negative press views on his non-recusal 72
This, of course, ignores the very standard itself-impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. The widespread press criticism indicates a doubt
as to his impartiality.
Justice Scalia flamboyantly concludes: "If it is reasonable to think that a
Supreme Court Justice can 273
be bought so cheap, the Nation is in deeper
trouble than I had imagined."
C. Should Justice Scalia have Recused Himself?
Freedman and Smith call Justice Scalia's refusal "both disappointing
and disingenuous. 2 74 Justice Scalia's belief that his flight on Air Force Two
was worthless-he had purchased a round trip ticket on a regular airline, and
thus saved no money-is disingenuous because most would view an Air
Force Two flight as a valuable thing.275 But the rest of his brief is legally
correct.
Unfortunately, however, Justice Scalia, in reading the law correctly,
indicates a flaw in the present law of recusal (and disqualification). Friends
should and must recuse themselves.

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 916.
Id. He is arguably correct.
Id. at 917.
Id. at 918-19.
Id. at 923.
Id. at 929.
FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 262.
Cheney, 541 U.S. at 920-21.

D. PoliticalPostscript
Often a bad decision will cause legal reform. This occurred when Chief
Justice Rehnquist refused to recuse himself in Laird v. Tatum,276 a 1972
case, where Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist testified whether the
Army was performing illegal surveillance, and then refused to recuse
himself on that very same issue as a Supreme Court Justice, in a 5-4
decision. 77
This fact pattern probably led to more delineated
disqualification rules regarding recusal when the judge took part as a
prosecutor, witness, or party in that case.278
The problem is more complex in the Bush v. Gore279 election case,
because when all judges might be biased, necessity mandates no recusal2 z0
XIII.

HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS ON FRIENDSHIP RECUSAL

A pertinent query regarding whether judicial friendship with a lawyer or
party mandates recusal is whether the standard is workable? Friendship, it
will be recalled, is defined as more than ordinary social intercourse, either
privately or publicly. 28 I
Friendship is more intimate than positive
acquaintance.282
A.

Hypothetical One: The Casual Golf Game

Most golfers will "pick up" a game at their club. Perhaps one member
of the regular foursome is ill. On this fine day, Judge Jones joins the
foursome, plays 18 holes, then sits with the other three golfers for a cold
drink afterward. The game was pleasant. Absent a pending or ongoing case
involving one party, this social intercourse would not mandate recusal or
disqualification.
B. Hypothetical Two: The Regular Foursome
Let us say Judge Day plays golf each Sunday with the same three
players, two of whom are lawyers and one is a banker. This close
association should be characterized as a friendship, and mandate recusal for
the judge from cases directly involving any of the parties.

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 232-36.
See, e.g., supra note 231.
Bush v. Gore, 581 U.S. 98 (2000).
See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
See discussion supraPart Ill.
Id.
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C.

Hypothetical Three: The Bar Function

Judge Smith attends several bar events each year. He will often colecture with a few individuals and will chat with lawyers who he sees in
court. These positive acquaintances do not rank as friendship for the
purpose of recusal.
D. Hypothetical Four: The Early MorningJog
Judge Adam jogs out of doors a few mornings a week. Occasionally, he
crosses paths with a neighbor and occasionally they chat. This acquaintance
does not mandate recusal.
E.

Hypothetical Five: Tailor Ted

Judge Bob has his new suits altered by tailor Ted. These alterations
occur once or twice a year. The conversation is friendly, but no special
pricing is given the judge. Again, no recusal is necessary.
F.

Hypothetical Six: The Wedding

Judge Mary is invited to an exclusive wedding of one of her high school
classmates, and attends the well-heeled affair. Mary should recuse herself
from litigation involving the classmate.
G. Hypothetical Seven: FridayNight Poker
Poker, by its nature, not on the professional level, is an intimate game.
It is characterized by joviality, cussing, and sharing of off-the-record
comments. Regular poker buddies are friends under this definition.
H. Hypothetical Eight: Pick-up Basketball
Unlike the regular golf foursome above, absent a highly regular and
formalized game, playing such games at the gym does not create friendship.
I.

Hypothetical Nine: Social Confidants

Most people have one to three people who are their social confidants.
The confidant may be privy to detailed information regarding the confidant's
children, spouse, lover, co-workers, etc. Clearly the confidant is a friend for
recusal purposes.

J.

Hypothetical Ten: The War Buddy

In war or similar extreme stress, men and women form ties of loyalty
that endure throughout life. They are friends.
The above list is not exhaustive, but should indicate that friendship is
not an amorphous standard that cannot be applied. A judge need not
disclose, other than in general terms, that he or she is recusing himself or
herself based on friendship grounds. A motion to disqualify a judge based
on friendship should similarly be simple. If the judge denies the friendship,
in most cases, that should end the matter in favor of the judge's denial. 3
XIV. CONCLUSION

The trend in judicial ethics has been to adopt objective standards of
impartiality. These have been increasingly intricate and specific, as set out
in the text and footnotes above. Specific standards are both possible and
workable. Antipathy (enemy) standards have been developed already.
Additionally, judges do, in good faith, seek guidance as to when to
recuse themselves. Finally, the trend has been to favor specific standards as
to recusal, as opposed to amorphous standards about which reasonable
minds might disagree.
Judges generally stay within closed circles, and are rather isolated as a
group. This may just be their "judicial temperament," or it may be a
purposeful self-imposition of an unspoken friendship recusal rule.2 t 4
Friendship is a rare relationship, one that may engender more loyalty
than blood or business relationships-relationships that demand recusal.
Section 455, the Model Code, and the several states' codes need an added
provision: A judge must recuse himself or herself when he or she has a
friendship with a lawyer or named party to the litigation. Friendship does
not include the sharing of intimacies other than those beyond ordinary
business or social intercourse. Although friendship is characterized by
subjective loyalty, it is to be shown by objective manifestations of regular
and longstanding social or business intimacy and loyalty.
Only would a bad friend be a good judge.

283. Almost universally, only the otherwise corrupt will lie as to being friends,
284. 1 have personally noticed this among the many judges I know. Additionally, I have noticed
judges socially withdrawing and sequestering themselves with other judges once they are elevated to
the bench.

